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An Analysis of New York State’s
Flawed Recovery Scheme in Prenatal
Malpractice Actions: Why a Claim of
NIED Should Be Available to Plaintiffs
Amanda Campo*
I.

Introduction

Medical care presents many dangers to both physicians and patients.
As medicine advances, the power to treat and diagnose patients
increases, and so do the number of risks. 1 The number of medical
malpractice suits is also on the rise. 2 This rise has resulted in an
increased number of awards to victims and higher premiums for
malpractice insurance carriers that cover physicians and institutions. 3 In
allowing recoveries, courts balance competing policy goals and societal
costs to ensure that injured plaintiffs are justly compensated. However,
there are gaps in recoveries. In New York State, prior to 2006, one such
gap was a mother’s inability to recover when medical malpractice
resulted in miscarriage or stillbirth. Mothers could not bring a wrongful
death action on behalf of their stillborn child, nor could they bring any
personal cause of action, absent a physical injury independent from the
unsuccessful birth itself. For nearly twenty years, this particular class of
plaintiffs had no valid cause of action against prenatal care physicians.
In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals attempted to fill this gap in
the case of Broadnax v. Gonzalez.4 In Broadnax, the court held that a
woman may recover damages for emotional injuries resulting from

* J.D., Pace Law School, 2013; B.A., Siena College, 2010. The author wishes to
thank her family and friends for their continued support throughout her law school
journey. She also thanks the members of Pace Law Review for their hard work in editing
and reviewing this Note.
1. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 540
(6th ed. 2008).
2. See id. at 541.
3. Id.
4. 809 N.E.2d 645 (N.Y. 2004).

770

1

FLAWED RECOVERY S CHEME IN P RENATAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

2013]

7/26/2013 4:48 PM

N.Y. PRENATAL MALPRACTICE RECOVERY

771

miscarriage or stillbirth, even if she did not suffer any physical injuries. 5
This Note will analyze whether Broadnax successfully filled this
recovery gap. Parts II, III, and IV will discuss the history of a mother’s
failed attempts to gain recovery for the death of her stillborn child. Part
V will discuss Broadnax. I will argue that Broadnax is flawed, as
evidenced by subsequent cases that follow it as precedent. Finally, in
Part VI, I will offer a better solution: instead of receiving arbitrary
awards in the form of emotional damages, mothers should be given an
actual cause of action in the form of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress (“NIED”).
II.

A Brief Background on Medical Malpractice

Medical malpractice claims follow the tort theory of negligence. 6
Essentially, the doctor must have been negligent in his care of the
patient. The following elements must exist for victim to recover: (1) the
doctor must owe a duty of care to the patient; (2) the doctor must have
breached that duty of care; (3) there must be an injury; (4) the injury
must have been caused by the malpractice; and (5) such an injury must
have been reasonably foreseeable to the tortfeasor. 7 The medical
profession sets the appropriate standard of care. 8 Defendants trying to
prove the standard of care present expert testimony describing the pattern
of medical practice regarding the issue or injury in the case.9 Defenses to
a medical malpractice claim include arguments that the physician acted
according to the standard of medical care, or that the physician made an
error that does not rise to the level of malpractice. 10 Obstetricians face
the highest risk of being sued, and therefore, pay the highest insurance
premiums. 11

5. Id. at 649.
6. FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 336.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 336-37.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 337.
11. See id. at 441-42.
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III.
The History of Failed Attempts to Obtain Recovery for
Miscarriages or Stillbirths Caused by Medical Malpractice
A. Inability to Bring a Wrongful Death Action on Behalf of the
Stillborn Child Under New York Statute
In 1847, New York became the first state in the country to enact its
own wrongful death statute.12 The law was modeled after a nineteenth
century English statute entitled the “Fatal Accidents Act.” 13 This law
provided, for the first time, recovery for a family for the wrongful death
of a family member.14 The New York statute, set forth in New York
Estates, Powers, & Trusts Law (“EPTL”) section 5-4.1, provides the
following:
The personal representative . . . of a decedent . . . may
maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful
act, neglect or default which caused the decedent’s death
against a person who would have been liable to the
decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if death
had not ensued.15
The language of the statute sets forth three initial requirements: (1)
there must be a decedent; (2) the death must have been caused by a
wrongful act; and (3) the decedent would have been able to have
maintained a suit for damages if his death had not occurred. 16
Additionally, the only parties entitled to recover damages in a wrongful
death action are the decedent’s beneficiaries, or persons entitled to take
the decedent’s property after he dies, such as spouses, children, and
parents.17

12. New York’s Wrongful Death Statute: A Time for Change, LAWYERTIME.COM,
(Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.lawyertime.com/2010/04/new-york%E2%80%99s-wrongfuldeath-statute-a-time-for-change/ [hereinafter A Time for Change].
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney Supp. 2013).
16. Id.
17. A Time for Change, supra note 12.
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The damages recoverable in a wrongful death action are set forth in
EPTL section 5-4.3 and are limited to “fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent’s death . . . .” 18
Essentially, “[a] wrongful death claim is meant to compensate [the
family] for the future [economic] support and assistance they would have
received” had the decedent not died, as well as for loss of society. 19 In
calculating damages, courts look at the decedent’s income and future
earning potential, as well as the likelihood of future support and guidance
to the family members.20
In 1894, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that unborn
children and their parents do not satisfy the above requirements
necessary to sustain a wrongful death action. 21 Since then, the New York
Court of Appeals has consistently held that parents cannot bring a
wrongful death action for the loss of an unborn child. 22 This common law
rule is followed today. The two main policy reasons against recognizing
a wrongful death action for the death of an unborn child are: (1) the
inability to comply with requirements of the wrongful death action
because the courts cannot calculate a pecuniary injury for an unborn
child, and the New York statute requires that there be a decedent, or
living person who has died;23 and, (2) the assumption that the mother can
recover for her separate injuries sustained as a result of the tortious act.24
As to the first policy consideration, a fetus cannot satisfy the
requirements of a wrongful death cause of action. A fetus is not a
decedent within the meaning of the New York statute. A stillborn or
unborn child cannot be a decedent because it has not lived and died.
Second, it is very difficult to compute damages for an unborn child—a
necessary element of a wrongful death claim. In Butler v. Manhattan Ry.
Co., the New York Court of Appeals concluded that there were no
factors upon which to base damages for the unborn. 25 Specifically, the
court had no way of knowing whether the unborn child could have grown
up to be a healthy, strong, successful adult, or whether it would have

18. Id. (citing N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(a) (McKinney 1999)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Butler v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 38 N.E. 454 (N.Y. 1894).
22. See id.
23. See id.; see also Endresz v. Friedberg 248 N.E.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. 1969).
24. See generally Endresz, 248 N.E.2d at 905 (discussing that recovery under tort
provides an ample remedy for the distributees of a stillborn fetus).
25. See Butler, 38 N.E. at 454.
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been stricken with infirmity and weakness. 26 Therefore, the court could
not compute the expected earning power or success of an unborn child. 27
Furthermore, the family experienced no loss of society or loss of
financial contribution because the child never became part of their family
or formed a relationship with them (outside of the mother’s womb) upon
which the court could base pecuniary value. 28 As a result, any claim of
wrongful death will inevitably fail.
In Endresz v. Friedberg,29 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the Butler holding that parents of stillborn fetuses, whose deaths
allegedly had been caused by a third party’s wrongful act, could not
recover for the loss of the unborn child. 30 There, the plaintiff, Janice
Endresz, was injured in a car accident and delivered stillborn twins two
days later.31 Plaintiff brought two wrongful death actions against the
driver, one for each child.32 Although the unborn are not explicitly
discussed in section 5-4.1 of the EPTL, the court concluded that the New
York Legislature did not intend to include an “unborn” fetus within the
term “decedent.”33
The court justified its decision to limit recovery for loss of stillborn
children by relying on Ms. Endresz’s ability to recover for the injuries
she “sustained in her own person” as a result of the car accident. 34 The
court reasoned that including recovery for a mother’s suffering as a result
of the stillbirth and recovery for the wrongful death of the fetus would
provide a windfall to the plaintiff and unduly punish the tortfeasor. 35 In a
car accident caused by a negligent driver, it is easy to imagine that the
passengers will suffer an injury. Such was the case in Endresz, in which
the pregnant plaintiff requested $500,000 in damages for her own
personal injuries.36 However, as will be discussed below, it is not easy to
find such independent injuries suffered by a plaintiff during childbirth.
Thus, the recovery in prenatal medical malpractice cases was severely
limited following the Endresz decision.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 455.
Id.
Id.
248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969).
See id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 901.
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The No-Duty Rule

The case of Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp (Vaccaro II)37 established the
long-standing rule that prenatal care physicians do not owe a duty to
pregnant mothers, but only to fetuses. 38 This holding prevented mothers
from suing for their own injuries that resulted from prenatal medical
malpractice.
In Vaccaro I, parents brought a cause of action against a doctor and
a pharmaceutical company after their child was born alive, but without
arms or legs, in addition to other severe birth defects.39 The parents
alleged that the birth defects were caused by the drug Delalutin, a
hormone commonly administered to pregnant women to prevent
miscarriages.40 Ms. Vaccaro’s doctor dispensed the drug each month up
until the birth.41 The mother claimed “emotional damage” and “mental
anguish . . . allegedly sustained by reason of the birth of their deformed
child.”42
On appeal from the First Department, the New York Court of
Appeals held that where harm is inflicted upon the fetus in utero, a
mother cannot recover, because prenatal physicians do not owe pregnant
mothers a duty of care.43 As a result, the mother could not recover for
any injuries sustained by her in a medical malpractice action alleging
prenatal injuries (either stillbirth or birth defects), because her prenatal
care physician did not owe her duty of care. 44 This logic was certainly
flawed, because both the mother and the unborn fetus are obviously
patients of the prenatal care physician. However, Vaccaro II’s no-duty
holding remained the rule for all prenatal malpractice actions for nearly
twenty-five years.

37. 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980).
38. See generally id.
39. Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp. (Vaccaro I), 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1st Dep’t 1979),
rev’d, 418 N.E.2d 386 (N.Y. 1980).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See Vaccaro II, 418 N.E.2d at 387 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (majority
reversing the decision of the Appellate Division, which had denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss the first through the ninth causes of action).
44. Id. at 386-87.
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No Recovery for the Mother Absent an Independent Physical Injury

In Tebbutt v. Virostek,45 the Court of Appeals relied on the
aforementioned cases and further limited recovery in prenatal medical
malpractice. First, the court reiterated Vaccarro II’s holding that no duty
was owed to a mother by the physician whose malpractice allegedly
caused the death of her fetus.46 Second, the court confirmed that the
parents could not bring a wrongful death action on behalf of an unborn
child.47 Finally, the court’s holding implied that a mother could not
recover any damages absent an independent injury separate and apart
from the birth.48
Plaintiff Marta Tebbutt sued defendant Robert Virostek, a physician
who was caring for her throughout her pregnancy. 49 Defendant
performed an amniocentesis and the sample returned a significant
amount of blood.50 Plaintiff saw another doctor, who concluded that the
fetus was dead, and suggested that the amniocentesis could be the cause
of death.51 Plaintiff sued Virostek for malpractice. 52
Plaintiff suffered no physical injuries, but sought to recover
damages for emotional distress resulting from the stillbirth of her child. 53
The court first stated that, in light of Vaccarro II, it was clear that Ms.
Tebbutt could not recover for any emotional injuries because her
physician did not owe her a duty of care. 54 The Tebbutt court noted that
in Endresz, the plaintiff’s injuries were the “direct result of defendants’
breach of a clearly recognized duty to drive with a reasonable degree of
care.”55 Thus, the majority distinguished the circumstances of Tebbutt
from Endresz because, although both mothers suffered emotional
injuries, the defendant driver in Endresz owed a duty to the plaintiff, but

45. 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985).
46. Id. at 1143.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1144 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1145.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1143 (majority opinion).
54. Id. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion despite the lower court’s
following statement: “[d]efendant, a licensed physician, was caring for plaintiff who, at
35 years of age, was pregnant.” Tebbutt v. Virostek, 477 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (3d Dep’t
1984) (emphasis added).
55. Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1144.
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the defendant doctor in Tebbutt owed no duty to the pregnant mother. 56
The court also applied Endresz’s wrongful death analysis to
Tebbutt’s medical malpractice set of facts. The court reaffirmed the longstanding rule that “no action for wrongful death could be maintained by
the personal representative of a stillborn fetus.”57 However, the court in
Endresz based its ruling on the fact that Ms. Endresz could collect
damages for her separate injuries sustained as a result of the car
accident.58 Conversely, in Tebbutt, the only separate injuries experienced
by the plaintiff were emotional injuries, not physical injuries. 59
Ultimately, the Tebutt court held the following: a mother could not
recover for emotional injuries resulting from injury to her fetus absent a
showing that she suffered a physical injury, distinct from that suffered by
the fetus, and not a normal incident of childbirth. 60
D.

The Zone-of-Danger Fails

Several decisions in the Appellate Division have also rejected the
notion that the zone-of-danger rule applies in prenatal malpractice
cases.61 In Guialdo v. Allen, the Appellate Division, First Department,
held that the mother could not recover for the harm done to her fetus
unless the defendant created an “unreasonable risk of . . . harm” to the
mother.62 In that case, the court held that this threshold had not been met;
in other words, following the Tebbutt standard, the Guialdo court
determined that the mother must suffer a separate injury, distinct from
the childbirth, in order to recover damages.63

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. 1969).
59. Tebbutt, 483 N.E.2d at 1143.
60. See id. at 1143-44.
61. See, e.g., Guialdo v. Allen, 567 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1st Dep’t 1991); see also Alicia
A. Ellis, Note, Better Late Than Never: New York Finally Closes the “Gap” in Recovery
Permitted for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Prenatal Medical Malpractice
Cases, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 735-39 (2006).
62. Guialdo, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
63. Id. (citing Prado v. Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 536
N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep’t 1988)).
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IV. The Problem: No Recourse for a Narrow Class of Plaintiffs
A.

No Recovery

The gap in New York’s recovery scheme was clear. A mother could
recover for her own physical injuries resulting from a car crash, but not
for mental injuries resulting from the stillbirth of her child—although
both “injuries” were allegedly caused by another’s negligence. 64 As
discussed above, the Endresz court justified its holding by asserting that
a mother would recover for the independent physical injuries caused by
the negligent actor. 65 In a car accident, resulting stillbirths are commonly
accompanied by a mother’s actionable physical injuries. In a stillbirth,
quite often, the only injury experienced by mothers who deliver a
stillborn child is emotional distress—which is not to be minimized, and
should be compensated. Thus, the requirement that mothers experience a
separate physical injury, distinct and apart from the childbirth itself, is
unreasonable because this is a very high burden to satisfy. 66 Childbirth is
a rigorous experience, with many injuries suffered by the mother
throughout the process. Many New York courts have concluded that such
injuries are merely incidental to pregnancy and birth, and are therefore
not actionable. Likewise, the Guialdo court held that mother’s physical
injuries could not be normal incidents of childbirth. 67 As a result, many
women could not recover for the loss of their child because they did not
suffer any physical injuries themselves.
B.

Doctors Are Immunized from Liability

Disturbingly, New York’s case law effectively insulated negligent
physicians from liability. Whether the child was injured and born alive or
whether it was stillborn, the actions of the physician in such cases
usually caused injury to the child only—not the mother. As established in
Part III, in cases where the child did not survive the birth, the stillborn
child could not bring a cause of action of his own, and his parents had no
claim either. As established, the mother could not sue for her emotional

64. Ellis, supra note 61, at 739.
65. Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. 1969).
66. Ellis, supra note 61, at 737-38.
67. Guialdo, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (citing Prado v. Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn
& Queens, Inc., 536 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep’t 1988).
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distress caused by the doctor’s malpractice if she did not suffer a separate
physical injury. As a result, the physician escaped unscathed despite the
unborn life he destroyed. Both the unborn child and its parents were left
without a voice and without reparation. As a result, the physician could
continue to practice and do harm to others in the future—because he had
not been held accountable for his wrongdoing. As expressed in the Tebutt
dissent, unborn children were left in “juridical limbo, where negligent
acts, with fatal effect, performed upon the child are neither compensated
nor deterred.”68
V.

New York’s Solution: Broadnax v. Gonzalez

In Broadnax v. Gonzalez, the New York Court of Appeals overruled
Tebbutt and established grounds for recovery for would-be mothers who
have lost fetuses as a result of malpractice. 69 First, the court held that a
prenatal care physician owes a duty of care to expectant mothers. 70
Second, the court held that a mother may sue for her emotional anguish
despite the absence of a separate physical injury. 71 As a result, Broadnax
gave the unborn and their mothers some sort of voice, but at what cost?
This section discusses Broadnax, its implications, and the flaws in its
application.
A.

Broadnax Generally

The Broadnax decision consolidated two similar cases: Broadnax v.
Gonzalez and Fahey v. Canino.72 The chilling facts of the two cases are
as follows:
1. Broadnax v. Gonzalez
During her pregnancy, Karen Broadnax was under the care of
Frederick Gonzalez, an obstetrician, and Georgia Rose, a midwife. 73 On
September 25, 1994, at 1:45 A.M., plaintiff telephoned her midwife to

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (N.Y. 1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648-49 (N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
See id. at 646-47.
Id. at 646.
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inform the midwife “that her water had broken and that she had expelled
a large amount of blood.”74 The midwife advised plaintiff and her
husband to meet the midwife at the Westchester Birth Center. 75 When
plaintiff arrived at 3:00 A.M., she experienced vaginal bleeding again. 76
The midwife telephoned the obstetrician, Gonzalez, and the obstetrician
directed that the plaintiff be transferred to the Columbian Presbyterian
Allen Pavilion in Manhattan.77 Plaintiff, her husband, and the midwife
arrived at the Allen Pavilion at 3:45 A.M., but the obstetrician had not yet
arrived.78 About forty-five minutes later, and two hours after the plaintiff
first arrived at the Westchester Birth Center, the obstetrician examined
the plaintiff.79 He “detected fetal heart rate decelerations [and] rather
than performing an emergency cesarean section, [he] conducted a vaginal
and pelvic examination.”80 He then performed a sonogram and did not
detect a fetal heartbeat.81 A half-hour later, at 5:15 A.M., the obstetrician
delivered a stillborn baby girl via cesarean section. 82 Autopsy reports
concluded that “a placental abruption caused the fetus to die before
delivery.”83 The Broadnaxes sued the obstetrician, Gonzalez, alleging
that his failure to recognize and treat the placental abruption was medical
malpractice, which had caused the death of the fetus. 84 However, plaintiff
only suffered emotional and psychological injuries. 85
2. Fahey v. Canino
The second issue in Broadnax concerned plaintiff Debra Ann
Fahey, who was a patient of Dr. Anthony Canino during her pregnancy. 86
In August 1999, Dr. Canino informed plaintiff that she was pregnant
with twins.87 In October 1999, during a visit with Dr. Canino’s partner,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 646-47.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Dr. Patrick Ruggiero, plaintiff “complained of lower abdominal pains
and cramping.”88 Dr. Ruggiero subsequently performed an ultrasound on
plaintiff, and concluded that one of the twins was pressing against
plaintiff’s sciatic nerve. 89 Two days later, plaintiff called Dr. Canino and
complained of increasing pain and nausea. 90 Dr. Canino, relying on
Ruggiero’s examination, advised plaintiff to lie down, told her that the
pain and nausea were probably related to her sciatic nerve or to
something that she had eaten.91 Two hours later, plaintiff delivered one
of her twins while sitting on the toilet. 92 She was rushed to the hospital,
where she delivered the second twin.93 Neither baby survived.94
Other doctors subsequently diagnosed plaintiff with an
“incompetent cervix.”95 During her second pregnancy, plaintiff
underwent a procedure to remedy this condition and successfully gave
birth to a premature, but live, child. 96 The plaintiff sued her first doctor
for medical malpractice for failing to diagnose and treat her cervical
condition, which had caused the stillbirth of her twins. 97
3. The Decision
On April 1, 2004, the New York Court of Appeals held that “even
in the absence of an independent injury, medical malpractice resulting in
miscarriage or stillbirth should be construed as a violation of a duty of
care to the expectant mother” thereby “entitling her to damages for
emotional distress.”98 In their opinion, the majority criticized the flaws of
New York’s case law in this area, particularly referring to the fact that
doctors were protected from suit if their negligence caused a stillbirth. 99

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 648-49.
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In its decision, the court overruled Vaccarro II and Tebbutt’s noduty holdings, by establishing a new rule that physicians owe “a duty of
reasonable care” to expectant mothers. 100 “[I]n treating a pregnancy,
medical professionals owe a duty of care to the developing fetus . . .
[thus] they surely owe a duty of reasonable care to the expectant mother,
who is, after all, the patient.”101 The court further reasoned that a
physician owes a pregnant mother a duty of care because “the health of
the mother and fetus are linked.”102
The Broadnax court also addressed the long-standing rule that
wrongful death actions cannot be brought on behalf of the unborn: “[i]t is
time to fill the gap. If the fetus cannot bring the suit, ‘it must follow in
the eyes of the law that any injury here was done to the mother.’” 103
However, the court declined to overrule Endresz, stating that “a mother’s
recovery [is limited] only to damages for the emotional distress attending
a stillbirth or miscarriage caused by medical malpractice.” 104 Further,
Broadnax did “not depart from [the] holding in Endresz v. Friedberg, . . .
barring wrongful death actions under these circumstances.” 105 Yet, by
providing some sort of recovery for the mother for the mental anguish
suffered, the court nonetheless attempted to “level the playing field” for
plaintiffs who were previously unable to bring wrongful death actions. 106
B.

The Flaws

Broadnax was seen as finally “closing the gap”107 and providing
justice for those families who had suffered a stillbirth as a result of
medical malpractice. However, Broadnax is not a perfect decision, and
some of its flaws are discussed below.

100. Id. at 649.
101. Id. at 648 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 1951)) (recognizing
an implied duty of care owed to a developing fetus).
102. Id. at 648-49.
103. Id. at 648 (quoting Tebutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1149 (N.Y. 1985)
(Kaye, J., dissenting)).
104. Id. at 649 n.4.
105. Id. (citation omitted).
106. See id.
107. Ellis, supra note 61.
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1. Broadnax Does Not Explicitly Recognize a Cause of Action for
This Class of Plaintiffs
The Broadnax v. Gonzalez decision is ambiguous, because the court
did not explicitly state that women whose stillbirths or miscarriages were
caused by medical malpractice had a recognized cause of action. 108 This
limits the decision’s applicability. The court did not suggest that that
negligence or negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were
available to these mothers. Rather, it simply permitted recovery for
emotional damages with no other analysis. 109 Thus, women still did not
possess an explicitly described claim, explaining the elements needed to
allow recovery. They were simply entitled to an arbitrary award of
emotional damages if the fact-finder weighed the evidence in their favor.
2. The Dissent’s Concerns: What Will Emotional Damages Cost?
In her dissenting opinion in Broadnax, Judge Read raised several
concerns regarding the soundness of the decision. First, the judge
expressed concern as to the increased liability of medical caregivers,
particularly in the specialty of obstetrics. Judge Read stated that:
Today’s ruling exposes medical caregivers to
additional liability for the treatment they provide to
pregnant women. . . . [T]here is no way for us to predict
or assess the potential effect on this expansion of
liability, however modest it may appear, on the cost and
availability of gynecological and obstetrical services in
New York State.110
Although the impact of this risk is unknown, studies show that
“when choosing a residency, the medical liability issue influenced the
choice of state for [thirty-nine percent] of medical students, and it
affected the choice of specialty for [fifty percent] of them.” 111 In an area
108. See id. at 740-44, 745-50 (discussing the holding and rationale in Broadnax
and the reactions and limitations in its holding).
109. See id. at 742-43 (stating that emotional damages could be recovered under
Broadnax).
110. Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 650 (N.Y. 2004) (Read, J.,
dissenting).
111. Pamela Robinson, et al., The Impact of Medical Legal Risk on Obstetrician-

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/7
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of medical practice where doctors are now subject to suit for pure
emotional injuries, unlike in many other malpractice claims, doctors may
be less willing to risk specializing in an area for fear of high insurance
premiums and a higher risk of being sued. Recent studies show that
insurance is rising, especially for high-risk specialties like obstetrics.112
The judge also felt uncomfortable asking a jury to “quantify the
emotional distress that a woman feels upon suffering a miscarriage or
stillbirth.”113 While the mothers definitely suffered extreme emotional
disturbance as a result of the death of their unborn child, it is possible for
damages awards to get out of control. Thus, arbitrary estimations are
suspect. The jury should have orderly guidelines upon which to base
emotional damages.
In tort claims, emotional damages are often met with criticism, and
are usually seen as dangerous. They can be very high, arbitrary, and
easily “feigned.”114 Physical or quantifiable injuries are often required. 115
As Thomas Moore and Matthew Gaier state in Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Medical Malpractice,116
One of the most nebulous and problematic areas of tort
law is that involving recovery for negligently inflicted
damages which are purely emotional, psychological, or
mental in nature . . . . On the one hand, the courts seek to
assure that there is a remedy for a significant injury. On
the other hand, there is the fear of opening the floodgates
of litigation based upon injuries which are often
amorphous.117
Thus, there is the fear that Broadnax will open the floodgates for
pure emotional damages in cases where the child has not died, but has
survived with permanent congenital injuries. There, a mother may
experience emotional distress as a result of having a brain-damaged

Gynecologist Supply, 105 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1296, 1300 (2005).
112. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 225 (8th ed. 2004).
113. Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 650 (Read, J., dissenting).
114. Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Medical Malpractice, N.Y. L.J., July 17, 2000, at 3.
115. Ellis, supra note 61, at 730; Eugene Kontorovich, Comment, The Mitigation of
Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 491, 493-94 (2001).
116. Moore & Gaier, supra note 114, at 3.
117. Id.
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child.118 Additionally, emotional damages could possibly extend to
prenatal malpractice claims in other negligence cases in which injuries
led to a miscarriage, like car accidents. 119 Surely, in car accident cases,
the driver has no reason to foresee that his actions will cause emotional
harm to a pregnant woman. Critics fear that there is the potential for pure
emotional damages to spiral out of control. 120
3. Broadnax as Precedent: Ferreira v. Wyckoff Heights Medical
Center121
Ferreira v. Wyckoff Heights Medical Center was the first case
decided on similar facts since Broadnax’s monumental holding. Ferreira
may represent the fears that the dissenting views in Broadnax had about
cost and increased liability. There, Ms. Ferreira was awarded one million
dollars for her emotional suffering as a result of a stillbirth.122
In April 1997, plaintiff Lucia Ferreira, who was pregnant, was first
treated at Wyckoff Heights Medical Center. 123 She had a fever, headache,
and lower abdominal pain, and was hospitalized for six days. 124 On June
18, 1997, plaintiff returned to Wyckoff with similar complaints, as well
as some vaginal spotting.125 During that visit, she was given “a drug that
relaxes the uterine muscles and [that] is used to stop premature labor.” 126
She was also placed on a fetal monitor. 127 A strep culture was taken and
an antibiotic was administered. 128 Plaintiff was diagnosed with a vaginal
infection and discharged on June 23, 1997.129

118. Marian E. Silber & Maria Elyse Rabar, Damages for Stillbirth: Will the
Floodgates Be Opened?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 30, 2004, at 27.
119. Id.
120. See generally id.
121. 885 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App. Term 2009).
122. Id. at 148.
123. Id. at 147.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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On June 25, 1997, plaintiff was again admitted to Wyckoff with
similar medical complaints.130 After she received another drug to prevent
premature labor, plaintiff was discharged on June 27, 1997.131 Two days
later, plaintiff once again returned to Wyckoff where she was determined
not to be in labor and was given antibiotics for a possible urinary tract
infection.132 On June 30, at 12:25 A.M., plaintiff again returned to
Wyckoff, was determined not to be in labor, and left.133 She returned the
same morning between 8:00 A.M. and 9:00 A.M., was given a prescription
for Tylenol with codeine, and was sent home. 134 Plaintiff was thirty-two
to thirty-three weeks pregnant at this time. 135
On July 1, around 9:00 A.M., plaintiff began experiencing the “urge
to urinate, but was unable to empty her bladder.” 136 She also experienced
increased abdominal discomfort.137 Around 12:00 P.M., plaintiff went
into labor and before the ambulance arrived, delivered the baby foot-first
at home. 138 The child did not survive the birth. 139 The baby was later
determined to have died of asphyxia because its head had been wedged
in the birth canal. 140
Ms. Ferreira subsequently sued Wyckoff Heights Medical Center. 141
She claimed “that she suffered great emotional pain as a result of this
event.”142 The jury concluded that “Wyckoff had deviated from good and
accepted medical practice [when it sent] plaintiff home on June 30, 1997
with a prescription for Tylenol with codeine without properly evaluating,
admitting, and treating her, and that this was a substantial factor in
causing the death of the plaintiff’s baby.”143 The jury also found that
Ferreira was negligent in not seeking further medical attention after
being sent home on June 30, 1997, but that her negligence was not a

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 147-48.
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substantial factor in causing the death of the baby. 144 The plaintiff was
awarded one million dollars for her emotional distress suffered from July
1, 1997 up to the date of the verdict. 145
Ferreira may be what Judge Read’s dissent in Broadnax and other
legal writers feared: an opening of the floodgates and exposure to high
awards.146 There is no doubt that the physicians at Wyckoff Heights
Medical Center should have been more diligent in examining a pregnant
plaintiff who was close to term and complaining of abdominal pain and
other ailments. An arbitrary award is what the critics of Broadnax feared.
Ferreira confirmed these fears.
VI. The Better Solution: Bringing Suit for Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress
Stillbirths and miscarriages caused by medical malpractice fit
cleanly into a NIED claim. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
NIED as follows:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress
to another, he is subject to liability to the other for
resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person,
and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized
that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness
or bodily harm. 147
Broadnax v. Gonzalez was not decided on NIED grounds—it did
not give women a clear cause of action. 148 The court did not explicitly
state that an NIED claim applied to these mothers. 149 Rather, it simply

144. Id. at 148.
145. Id.
146. See Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 649-50 (N.Y. 2004) (Read, J.,
dissenting); Silber & Rabar, supra note 118.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
148. See generally Broadnax, 809 N.E.2d at 645.
149. See generally id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/7

18

FLAWED RECOVERY S CHEME IN P RENATAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

788

PACE LAW REVIEW

7/26/2013 4:48 PM

[Vol. 33:2

permitted recovery for emotional damages with no other analysis. 150
Allowing mothers to sue doctors for NIED gives victims a voice and
holds doctors accountable, but limits arbitrary emotional damages so that
they do not spiral out of control.
A.

The Foundation for NIED in New York
1. “Freedom From Mental Disturbance”

The earliest case to recognize the right to recover damages for
negligently inflicted emotional injuries in New York was Ferrara v.
Galluchio,151 decided by the Court of Appeals in 1958. There, the
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action for burns suffered as a
result of an X-ray administered by the Defendant. 152 In addition to
seeking damages for the burns, she also sued for emotional injuries
suffered after learning from her dermatologist that the burns might
become cancerous. 153 The plaintiff introduced testimony of a neuropsychiatrist who indicated that the plaintiff suffered from “severe
cancerophobia.”154 The lower court awarded the plaintiff $25,000,
$15,000 of which was for the emotional distress caused by the
cancerophobia.155 The New York Court of Appeals upheld the award,
declaring that “such recovery was justified” and that “freedom from
mental disturbance is now a protected interest” in New York. 156
2. Emotional Injuries Suffered by Third Parties
New York State has been reluctant to permit recovery for emotional
injuries sustained as a result of another’s harm. Thus, third parties, such
as witnesses of a tort committed upon someone else, usually cannot
recover for the emotional disturbances they suffer as a result of
witnessing the accident. This also includes parents who are distraught
over a child’s injury. In Tobin v. Grossman,157 the court held that a
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See generally id.
152 N.E.2d 249, 252-53 (N.Y. 1958).
See id. at 250-51; see also Moore & Gaier, supra note 114, at 3.
Ferrara, 152 N.E.2d at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 252.
249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969).
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mother could not recover for mental injuries of shock and fear sustained
after her child was hit by a car.158 There, the plaintiff did not actually
witness the accident, but had observed her injured child lying in the road
immediately after he was struck by the vehicle. 159 The court opined that
the problem with allowing recovery in these instances was that the
plaintiff was “not directly the victim” of the accident. 160 The court feared
that permitting a cause of action under these circumstances would
impose a new duty on a negligent actor to unforeseeable victims (such as
distraught bystanders or family members of victims) and create unlimited
liability:161
It would extend to older children, fathers, grandparents,
relatives, or others in loco parentis, and even to sensitive
caretakers, or even any other affected bystanders.
Moreover, in any one accident, there might well be more
than one person indirectly but seriously affected by the
shock of injury or death to the child. 162
Arguably, it would be unreasonable for all affected third persons to
sue the negligent actor for mental injuries. It would certainly open the
floodgates to increased litigation for attenuated claims. However,
allowing recovery for some while excluding others would prevent
creation of a uniform rule. 163 The Tobin court therefore denied recovery,
reasoning that “[i]t is enough that the law establishes liability in favor of
those directly or intentionally harmed.”164 The court also pointed out the
harsh reality that suffering mental anguish from the loss or injury of a
child “is the risk of living and bearing children.” 165
This logic is flawed, however, when applied to prenatal malpractice
claims. Pregnant mothers should not be seen as mere bystanders or third
parties, such as those parents or family members who have witnessed
their child get hit by a car. As the court in Broadnax held, a physician
directly owes pregnant mothers a duty of care because “the health of the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 419-20; see also Moore & Gaier, supra note 114, at 5.
Tobin, 249 N.E.2d at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 423.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
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mother and fetus are linked.”166 Therefore, the mother has standing to
bring a cause of action for NIED, not as a third party, but as a direct
victim to whom a duty is owed.
3. Exception: The Zone-of-Danger Rule
The zone-of-danger rule is an exception to the general proposition
that third parties cannot recover for a tort committed upon another. In
Bovsun v. Sanperi,167 the New York Court of Appeals permitted recovery
for damages where the plaintiff was in the zone of danger. In such cases,
where a defendant negligently exposes a plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of bodily injury or death, the plaintiff
may recover, as a proper element of his or her damages,
damages for injuries suffered in consequence of the
observation of the serious injury or death of a member of
his or her immediate family.168
Bovsun consisted of two cases in which the plaintiffs and their family
members were involved in a car accident and the plaintiffs immediately
witnessed the injury to their family member. 169 The court found that the
“instantaneous awareness” of severe injury to a family member was
sufficient to entitle recovery for emotional damages. 170
However, as discussed above, zone-of-danger claims have failed in
prenatal malpractice claims.171 Nevertheless, mothers should not bring
causes of action for emotional distress under a zone-of-danger theory. A
mother’s recovery should not be based upon merely viewing her stillborn
child; rather, she should be able to recover as a direct victim of the tort.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648-49 (N.Y. 2004).
461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984).
Id. at 848.
See id.
Id. at 850.
See, e.g., Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142 (N.Y. 1985).
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B. Why NIED Works for Prenatal Malpractice Claims Resulting from
Miscarriages or Stillbirths
Permitting mothers of children who are stillborn as a result of
malpractice to bring NIED claims is logical for several reasons:
1. The Victims Fit the Elements of a NIED Claim
Mothers of children who are stillborn as a result of malpractice fit a
NIED claim. Again, the elements of NIED are:
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress
to another, he is subject to liability to the other for
resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved
an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person,
and
(b) from facts known to him should have realized
that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness
or bodily harm. 172
In a stillbirth case, the doctor has often been negligent in his care of
both the mother and the fetus. It is possible that the mother may bring a
successful NIED claim if she can prove that the doctor’s conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress. Usually, the
negligent conduct (such as failing to perform an ultrasound or emergency
cesarean section) creates an unreasonable risk of causing distress to the
mother, because her baby could die. Furthermore, it is foreseeable to the
doctor that a pregnant patient will suffer severe emotional harm if a
stillbirth results from the negligence. Thus, while unintentional, the
doctors have negligently inflicted emotional distress upon the mother as
a result of his unreasonable conduct.
In Ferreira, the plaintiff was very close to term and experiencing
spotting and abdominal pain.173 Perhaps instead of repeatedly
discharging the plaintiff, the doctors should have admitted her and
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965).
173. Ferreira v. Wyckoff Heights Med. Ctr., 885 N.Y.S.2d 143, 147 (App. Term
2009).
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performed an ultrasound or cesarean section. After all, the baby was in a
breech position when it was ultimately born in plaintiff’s home, and this
position could have been determined by further examination. In Ferreira,
the plaintiff could have sustained a NIED cause of action by claiming
that the doctor’s decision-making created an unreasonable risk of
emotional harm, because the conduct could result in a stillbirth. Again, a
doctor should foresee that his negligent conduct may cause a stillbirth,
and severe emotional damage will obviously result on the part of the
mother.
2. NIED Continues to “Bridge the Gap”
Allowing mothers to bring a NIED claim will continue to bridge the
gap in New York’s recovery scheme. First, a NIED claim preserves
Broadnax’s holding that prenatal care physicians owe pregnant women a
duty of care in the event of stillbirths resulting from malpractice. Both
the child and mother are patients of the prenatal care physician. If the
child dies as the result of the doctor’s negligence, the doctor must be held
liable for any injuries caused to the mother, regardless of whether the
injuries are mental or physical. Essentially, in NIED, a doctor owes the
pregnant patient a duty of care. Thus, if the doctor breaches that duty by
negligently caring for her, this breach results in the death of the baby,
and it was foreseeable that the doctor’s actions could cause the mother
severe mental anguish, then the doctor is liable to the mother for
emotional damages. Accordingly, because the mother now has a clear
cause of action on her own behalf, the bridge across the recovery gap
established in Broadnax is preserved, and the “narrow class of plaintiffs”
who were previously denied recovery may obtain redress.
Allowing a cause of action for NIED for mothers upholds the
principles of justice. As expressed by the dissenters in Tebbutt v.
Virosteck (decided before Broadnax), unborn children and their mothers
were left in “juridical limbo, where negligent acts, with fatal effect,
performed upon the child are neither compensated nor deterred.” 174
These unborn children need a voice, not to mention that their mothers are
undoubtedly left with uncompensated emotional damages. Furthermore,
the doctors must be held responsible for their wrongdoings. As such, it
defies logic to hold that mothers are not owed a duty by prenatal care

174. Tebbutt v. Virostek, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (N.Y. 1985) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
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physicians, or that they are not entitled to any damages. Such was the
case before Broadnax.
3. A NIED Claim Eliminates Flaws in Broadnax
It is important to note that Broadnax is limited in its holding.
Specifically, Broadnax does not create an explicit cause of action for
these victims. Although the Broadnax court recognized that it was “time
to fill the gap” as if “the fetus cannot bring suit, it must follow in the
eyes of the law that any injury here was done to the mother,”175 the court
did so cautiously by stipulating that the mother was entitled “to damages
for emotional distress,” and no more. 176 Seemingly, the court did not
explicitly recognize a cause of action nor suggest that a cause of action
existed.177 A claim of NIED will remedy this flaw in Broadnax.
Additionally, the availability of a NIED claim will provide a more
orderly and controlled method for these mothers to obtain damages—a
notion not discussed by the court in Broadnax. The Broadnax decision
merely provided a starting point from which a mother could seek to
recover damages, but the court did not go far enough. NIED claims,
however, permit the fact-finder to quantify the plaintiff’s damages based
on satisfaction of the elements as well as consideration of all the
evidence. Arbitrary damages and “free-for-all” estimates of the value of
injuries sustained by the mother will no longer be realistic fears, as they
were for critics of Broadnax. At the same time, however, doctors will
still be held accountable for their wrongdoing.
VII.

Conclusion

In 2004, the New York Court of Appeals attempted to fill a
formidable and unjust gap in the recovery scheme for prenatal
malpractice actions. Broadnax v. Gonzalez overruled twenty years of
precedent, in which a mother’s miscarriage or stillborn resulting from
malpractice was denied any form of recovery for the mental anguish they
suffered. The New York Court of Appeals finally acknowledged that
prenatal care physicians owe a duty to the mother, who is, after all, the

175. Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648 (N.Y. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
176. Id. at 649.
177. See generally id.
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patient. Furthermore, it allowed mothers to recover for their emotional
injuries, even if they did not suffer any physical injuries as a result of the
malpractice.
However, Broadnax is not a perfect decision and is flawed in many
respects. Critics feared of an opening of the floodgates for arbitrary
emotional damages in cases involving prenatal torts. Furthermore,
Broadnax failed to completely provide mothers with a voice; they still
are unable to maintain a clear cause of action. Rather, mothers are merely
allowed to receive emotional damages for malpractice.
Mothers should be permitted to bring NIED claims against
negligent prenatal care physicians. These victims satisfy the elements of
the claim. Furthermore, the availability of a NIED claim will destroy any
earlier arguments that limit a mother’s recovery. Claims for NIED will
clear up ambiguities encompassed in Broadnax, thus truly filling the gap
by providing the mothers of deceased unborn children with a clear voice
once and for all.
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